ANALYSIS

Caning, flogging and starving

By Rafia Zakaria

The lack of questioning of the blatant disregard for gender disparity so visible in all of these incidents is not the only cause for deep dejection. Equally disturbing is the desire to make being a good Muslim not an issue of individual effort but of robotic obedience

It's been an eventful summer for Muslim women around the world. On August 14, 2009, Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed into law the Shia Personal Status Law, making it legal for Afghan men to starve their wives if they refused to have sexual relations with them. On July 29, 2009, Lubna Ahmed Hussein, a widowed Sudanese journalist, was threatened with forty lashes by Sudanese authorities for having worn dress pants in a public place. Finally, to look forward to next week, the caning of Malaysian model Kartika Shukarno for drinking beer in a nightclub in the eastern Malaysian state of Pahang.

Consider first the Shia Personal Status Law enacted into law by President Karzai, assumedly to appease a hard-line Shia cleric. The law not only grants exclusive rights to child custody to the father or grandfather but also requires women to ask for their husband or father's permission before leaving the home. The only time a woman would be allowed to leave home without such permission is if she has reasonable legal reasons, which are conveniently left unspecified.

Other provisions of the law are even more alarming. In the words of women's rights activist Wazhma Frough, “the law allows men to even deny food or any support to their wives if they refuse to have sex with them”. Other provisions of the law allow also make it possible for men to legally marry children enabling the custom of child marriage pervasive in rural Afghanistan.

According to Afghan female parliamentarian Shinkai Karokhail, the current law is still an improvement from the previous version which had made it impossible for women to leave the home without male permission under any circumstances and required them to have sexual relations with their husbands once every four days.

Moving on to Sudan, where Lubna Hussein, a journalist, was arrested on July 3, 2009 along with eighteen other women because she was wearing dress pants. There was nothing provocative about the tailored pants that fully covered her legs and yet Lubna Hussein stands threatened to be sentenced to forty lashes under the charge of “being dressed indecently”. Her name has been put on a travel blacklist by the ruling regime and she is now prohibited from leaving the country.

Ten of the women who were with Ms Hussein at the time of the arrest chose to plead guilty to “indecency”, paid a fine and were lashed ten times. Ms Hussein and another woman have chosen to fight the charges to bring attention to the plight of tens of thousands of women who have been lashed in the past decade under the country's indecency laws. The Islamist government in Sudan has routinely imposed draconian laws on Sudanese women to testify to their “Islamic” credential regardless of the law's actual relationship with Islamic doctrine. In the words of Ms Hussein: “These laws were made by this current regime which uses it to humiliate the people and especially women. These tyrants are here to distort the real image of Islam.”

Finally, take the case of Malaysia, a functioning democracy, relatively speaking, where Islamic courts function alongside civil courts. The consumption of alcohol is forbidden to Muslims but permitted to the country's Christian and Hindu minority. Ms Shukarno has been fined the equivalent of $1,400 and six strokes with a rattan cane. Ms Shukarno, who is married and a mother of two, was found guilty of drinking a beer in a hotel bar. In the northern Malaysian state of Kelyantan, Muslim women have also been forbidden from wearing bright lipstick and high heeled shoes that may make noise in order to promote public morality. According to Mohamed Isa Ralip, president of the Shariah Lawyers Association of Malaysia, it's not about causing pain, it is about educating others and about teaching the person a lesson.

The three contexts under discussion are undoubtedly different in demography, culture, geography and historical context. But they are all post-colonial Muslim states fraught with a crisis of authenticity that consistently leads them to believe that public displays of religious piety are at the core of religious practice. What easier targets to centre these expressions of piety and pristine public morality than the private and public behaviour of women?

The Afghan law essentially gives the state the right to enter the private sphere of the family and control even what happens between husbands and wives. It legislates essentially the nature of the relationship and creates a particular power dynamic that makes the woman an appendage to a man with her duties circumscribed entirely and completely by her gender. Political machinations aside, the law is an expression of an unapologetic patriarchal system where such subjugation enshrined in law is considered an expression of Afghan Islamic identity, legislated and signed into law through democratic process.

Similar tactics underlie the Sudanese and Malaysian cases. Ultimately, both represent the relegation of public morality as a task to be accomplished through legislation and enforced through instruments of the state such law courts. The underlying logic of all three cases is that if all temptations are forbidden by law, then all need for individual conscience will conveniently be eviscerated. The assumption is that in a perfect Islamic society, there would be no need for an individual conscience at all. If women are covered from head to toe, it is assumed, few would be tempted to engage in sexual promiscuity. If there is no bright lipstick, noisy high-heeled shoes, and women dressed in pants, it seems all Muslim men will suddenly become better believers and more eligible for heaven. If wives submit easily, can never refuse sex and are forced by the state to obey their husbands, then it is assumed men will be even less likely to covet other women.

The injustices in these scenarios are numerous, from the public subjugation of Muslim women as an expression of a society's piety to the fact that the system is designed entirely to facilitate the journey of men (not women) to heaven. But what is most notable in the framework is the desire on the part of Muslim publics in all three countries to have the state as a stand in for the conscience of the individual believer.

The lack of questioning of the blatant disregard for gender disparity so visible in all of these incidents is not the only cause for deep dejection. Equally disturbing is the desire to make being a good Muslim not an issue of individual effort but of robotic obedience. Few bother to ask whether giving Zakat, and abstaining from alcohol or sexual promiscuity really are exercises of obeying Divine Guidance when they are enforced by the state and are not questions of free will. Are robotic Muslims lulled into obedience by the threat of starvation, the fear of being caned or flogged at the same level of religious devotion as those who freely choose to abstain from forbidden acts?

Women and their subjugation have become the visible symbols of Islamic statehood and the piety of the Muslims that live in them. Instead of outrage, such incidents are met with approbation and lauded as efforts to Islamise society. If the worth of women and the tragedy of their subjugation is not enough for Muslims to be shocked out of their apathy, then perhaps the notion of a lulled ummah cornered into obedience out of fear rather than religious devotion should be.

[Rafia Zakaria is an attorney living in the United States where she teaches courses on Constitutional Law and Political Philosophy. She can be contacted at rafia.zakaria@gmail.com]

9/09/2009 04:07:00 PM | Filed under , | Read More »

Islam at crossroads: Who's to blame?

By M. Rajaque Rahman

It has become almost fashionable for a Muslim to say 'Islam is in danger'. The religion whose literal meaning is peace is today seen as the root cause of terror and violence. The Muslim world cannot merely dismiss this as a fallout of a grand conspiracy against Islam by people of other faiths. It has failed to present the real essence of Islam and remained a mute spectator to many atrocities against humanity committed in the name cleansing the world of infidels.

This diffidence to stand up for Islam is mainly due to lack of clarity among Muslims about what their religion truly stands for. The Muslim world is heavily weighed down by its own blinkered interpretation of what's permitted and forbidden in Islam. The most glaring misinterpretation that has led to a distortion of the very essence of Islam is its understanding of the ex-pression 'La Ilaaha Illallaah', which is the first principle of Islam. Literally translated, it means 'there is no god but God'.

However, generations of Muslims have been taught to interpret it as 'there is no god but Allah'. Thanks to this limiting interpretation, Muslims are made to believe that there are many gods, but only Allah is the right one. This understanding totally distorts Islam's real message of tauhid (oneness of God).

A case in point is the recent statement of chairman of National Fatwa Council of Malaysia Abdul Shukor Husin while passing a fatwa against yoga. "Many Muslims fail to understand that yoga's ultimate aim is to be one with a God of a different religion." When one has affirmed to 'La Ilaaha Illallaah', how can a Muslim think of another "God of a different religion".

If a Muslim thinks there are different Gods for different religions, he is negating the essence of Islam and unwittingly subscribing to polytheist beliefs. 'La Ilaaha Illallaah' establishes beyond argument that there is only one God. However differently we may pray and by whatever name we may call, it goes to that one source. Further, the Quran clearly states that God can be invoked in different names. "Glory be to God, beyond any associations. He is Allah, the Creator, the Evolver, the Bestower of Form. To Him belong the Most Beautiful Names." [Al Hashr 59:22].

Despite the clear pointers in the Quran, orthodox mullahs still hold that calling God by any other name than Allah amounts to associating a partner with Him. The biggest casualty of this exclusivity of Allah has been the concept of jehad, prompting innocent Muslims to believe that fighting against 'infidels' who don't call God by Allah is an act worthy for the Quranic promise of heaven for jehad. This amounts to challenging Quran's command to invoke God by any names with a sense of reverence and beauty.

This myopic interpretation of the concept of tauhid has had a domino effect on other spheres of life. Take the case of recent fatwas forbidding yoga for Muslims on the ground that yoga will erode their faith in the religion.

As the Quran and Hadith have nothing specific that will make practice of yoga haram, the ulemas based the ruling on their own fear of supposedly 'Hindu' elements of yoga destroying the faith of a Muslim. The best way to allay their fear is to look at the Hindu philosophy on yoga and see how and where it contradicts the tenets of Islam.

Yoga simply means uniting with the Self. Maharishi Patanjali's Yoga Sutras starts by calling itself an enunciation in union. The asanas, the practice of which is the focal point of these fatwas, are just one way of attaining that union. Is striving for such a union with the Self against Islam? It cannot be. For, Prophet Mohammed has said, "He who knows his own Self knows his Lord." Anything done in pursuit of knowing the Lord will count as a meritorious act of following the Prophet.

The best explanation of why yoga is not just permissible, but also desirable for Muslims is to be found in the second sutra of the Yoga Sutras. "Yogas Chitta Vritti Nirodhah." It means yoga is stopping all the modulations of the mind. Ceasing all the outward activities of the mind and reposing in Allah is the ultimate goal of Islam. So doing yoga asanas as a means of attaining a thoughtless state will qualify as the highest form of ibadat (prayer). Hence contrary to the fatwas, yoga as a spiritual pursuit is very much permissible in Islam.

It's universally proven that yoga brings peace of mind, and on that count yoga is almost obligatory for Muslims. As Islam means peace, peace of mind is a prerequisite for one to be truly following Allah's only religion.

This leaves only one ground for orthodox mullahs to frown at yoga: that yoga stems from polytheist beliefs of Hinduism. But when yoga means union, how can it be linked to polytheist beliefs? In fact, yoga takes one away from polytheism and leads to Advaita, which is in perfect agreement with the doctrine of tauhid.

The time has come for ulemas to dispel this mistaken understanding of the real essence of Islam. Else history will accuse them of doing a great disservice to Islam and unwittingly leading innocent Muslims towards polytheism.

[M. Rajaque Rahman is a former business journalist and now teaches yoga-based spiritual programmes of the Art of Living. He can be contacted at rajaque@gmail.com]

9/09/2009 04:06:00 PM | Filed under , | Read More »

Buttering up Nitish government: Muslim journalists’ favourite pastime in Bihar

By Saroor Ahmed

Sycophancy has its limit. And when one crosses it s/he loses all the self-respect. But the journalists and opinion-makers, in Bihar, especially Muslims, are caring little about it and are indulging in bootlicking of a unique sort.

Not to speak of Urdu media, which even fear to publish the comment of the opposition leaders, Muslims working in English and Hindi Press are going to any extent to come up with fantastic stories about the so-called performance of the Nitish Kumar government.

Read these opening lines of the story filed by Faizan Ahmad, the Times of India’s special correspondent in Patna: “Sometimes incentives make a world of difference. Even when it comes to education. Take for instance the state government’s cash incentive to Muslim students: money sure has helped mint merit. The scheme has resulted in a record jump in the number of Muslim students securing first division in the Matriculation exams.”

Then in the very second paragraph of the same story published on August 13, 2009 he quoted Shahid Ali Khan, the minister of minority welfare in the Nitish Kumar government: “The increase is over 100 per cent and the credit goes to the state government’s policy of giving cash incentive to each Muslim student passing out with a first division.”

The news story goes on to state that “The Nitish Kumar government in 2007 announced a reward of Rs 10,000 to each Muslim student securing first division at the Matriculation exam. That year a total of 2,627 Muslim students had passed out with first division. In 2008, this number swelled to 5,800 and in 2009 the number shot up to 11,500.”

Wait a moment and read what Khan told the same newspaper in the same news-story: “Students of 2008 batch will be handed over the reward money very soon and applications are being collected from the 2009 first divisioners.”

May one ask Faizan Ahmad and Shahid Ali Khan as to how is it that the Muslim students performed so well and the number of first divisioners got doubled when according to them they have not got the reward money of 2008, not to speak of 2009?

The big question is if the Muslim students did not get a single penny how is it that the number of first divisioners got doubled. Both the minister and the journalist tried to cheat the readers by hiding a very important fact. The number of not only the Muslim first divisioners have increased, but the performance in general has improved because unlike in the past the Bihar State Examination Board has now introduced the CBSE pattern of questions. Earlier the pattern of question was subjective, therefore, the percentage of those passing the examination and securing first division was much less.

It needs to be mentioned that 19.60 per cent of the Muslim students who passed in 2009 secured first division. The general percentage is 19.53 per cent. It also needs to be made clear that when the scheme was announced by the chief minister Nitish Kumar on November 11, 2007 it was none else but the alliance partner the BJP, which publicly issued statement opposing it. Even the finance department reportedly objected to it. And then too the argument was that the percentage of Muslims securing first division is slightly better in Bihar than the general, therefore, why should they be given incentive or reward. How was the percentage of Muslim first divisioners better than general in 2007 when the examination was held in March of the same year and the chief minister’s announcement came in November?

But the minister shamelessly went on to state in the Times of India story: “This sense of competition has yielded good results.” He further said that the scheme will motivate Muslim children to join schools.

The minister and journalist tried to take the readers and Muslim community for granted. The fact is that the state government did not even publish the form for applying for the reward money. Not to speak about this so-called reward for the first divisioners the state government has not published a single form for the four central government scholarships for minority students though the Centre created a separate fund for it. Not a single form of Post-Matric, Pre-Matric, Merit-cum-Means and Professional Courses scholarship was published in the last two years. The Centre announced these scholarship after the recommendation of the Sachar Committee report.
It is the organizations like Al-Khair Charitable Trust, Students Islamic Organization and Bihar Rabita Committee which jointly formed the Alpsankhiyak Chatwirti Morcha (Minority Scholarship Front), collected donation from the people and published and distributed thousands of forms to the students. In 2008 the central fund meant for the scholarship was allowed to lapse on March 31, 2008. This prompted the Morcha to stage a sit-in dharna near Patna’s busy Income Tax roundabout on April 23, 2008. It was only after this protest that the forms of the students submitted in the state minority welfare department were sent to the Centre. And even when the cheques came from the Centre to the state government it took months to be distributed among the beneficiary students.

This year too all the forms were published by the Morcha. The state government failed to renew the scholarship of the students of Professional Courses who got money last year. They are supposed to get scholarship till their course is completed. As there was no announcement, no advertisement and no notice from the state government about these scholarship––though the Centre has earmarked separate fund for publishing forms, giving newspaper ads and other related works––according to sources out of total quota for Bihar in Pre-Matric scholarship only one-fifth could apply this year. The last date of submission of forms was August 15 and they would now be sent to the Centre for the release of amount. Sources said that though Bihar’s quota was 1,60,000 the number of applications received is something between 30,000 and 32,000.

This is just a tip of an iceberg about scholarships. The real story is known to both the minister and journalist. But they are true clever by half and are befooling none, but themselves. Shahid Ali Khan, being a minister, is paid for being loyal to his chief minister, Nitish Kumar. But can a journalist like Faizan Ahmad go to such an extent. He is paid to publish the real story not to butter up the powers that be. But in the name of journalism this is happening now in Bihar.

9/02/2009 12:46:00 PM | Filed under | Read More »

Ramadan or Mah-e-Seyam: A month of Fasting, Charity and Piety

Ramadan like the other months in the Islamic lunar calendar begins with the sighting of the new moon over the horizon. Depending on the geographical locations, it appears with a difference of a day or two in various parts of the world pronouncing the arrival of the holy moments.

The Moon in the Islamic Calendar

Ramadan, also known as Mah-e-Seyam, the Holy month of fasting is 9th month in the Islamic calendar that succeeds Shaaban and precedes Shawwal. Any month in the Islamic calendar always begins and ends when after completing the full circle the new moon appears again over the horizon. A month can be of twenty nine days or thirty days but can never be of twenty eight days or thirty one days, as the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) has said: “The month (can be) 29 nights (i.e. days), and do not fast till you see the moon, and if the sky is overcast, then complete Sha'ban as thirty days.” (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Abdullah bin Umar)
At another place the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) has said:
“Do not fast (for Ramadan) before the coming of the month until you sight the moon or complete the number (of thirty days); then fast until you sight the moon or complete the number (of thirty days).” (Abu Dawood, Narrated by Hudhayfah)

Describing the new moon, Quran says: “They question you about the new moon. Tell them: it is to determine the periods of time for the benefit of mankind and for the Hajj (pilgrimage).” (Surah Al Baqara, Ayah 189)

Because the important prayers and obligations are associated with these months, we normally look for the new moon on three occasions. (1.) When Ramadan begins. (2.) When it ends. (3.) When begins Dhul Hijja - the month of Hajj.

After sighting the new moon on these occasions, while it is acceptable to greet each other, as a Muslim we need to recite the Dua (the prayer) that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) has advised us as confirmed by the following: When the Prophet of Allah (peace be upon him) saw the new moon, he said: "A new moon of good and right guidance; a new moon of good and right guidance; a new moon of good and right guidance. I believe in Him Who created you" three times. He would then say: "Praise be to Allah Who has made such and such a month to pass and has brought such and such a month." (Abu Dawood, Narrated by Qatadah)

At another place, it is reported: When the Prophet, peace be upon him, saw moon he would say, "Allah is the Greatest! O Allah, make it shine upon us in peace, faith, security, safety, and with the power to do what You love and are pleased with! O moon! Your Lord and our Lord is Allah." (At-Tabarani, Reported by Abdallah bin Umar)

In this Dua lies an important point. When we say O moon! Your Lord and our Lord is Allah, we admit that like us the moon is also the creature of the Almighty Allah. Hence as it follows the Lord despite not being as accountable to the Almighty as we are, we must also follow Him in every respect.

Ramadan, the Holy Month

After the new moon appears over the horizon pronouncing the beginning of Ramadan, blessings of the Almighty begin to shower on us. Allah's Apostle said: "When the month of Ramadan starts, the gates of the heaven are opened and the gates of Hell are closed and the devils are chained." (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Abu Huraira)

It is also reported that every night and at the time of Iftaar – the time when we end the fast, Allah Almighty forgives.

The main thing one should keep in minds that unlike Hajj that is performed only in the month of Dhul Hijja there is no prayer in Ramadan that is not being offered in other months. The difference is just of importance and obligations. The most important prayer that one performs in Ramadan is Saum or Fasting that is obligatory for every Muslim. Quran says: “O believers! Fasting is prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you so that you may learn self-restraint.” (Surah Al Baqara, Ayah 183)

Describing the importance of fasting, the Prophet said: "Whoever established prayers on the night of Qadr out of sincere faith and hoping for a reward from Allah, then all his previous sins will be forgiven; and whoever fasts in the month of Ramadan out of sincere faith, and hoping for a reward from Allah, then all his previous sins will be forgiven." (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Abu Huraira)

At another instance, Allah's Messenger (peace be upon him) said: "Ramadan, a blessed month, has come to you during which Allah has made it obligatory for you to fast. In it the gates of Heaven are opened, the gates of al-Jahim are locked, and the rebellious devils are chained. In it Allah has a night which is better than a thousand months. He who is deprived of its good has indeed suffered deprivation." (Narrated by Abu Hurayrah Al Tirmidhi. Ahmad and Nasa'i transmitted it)

Allah's Messenger (peace be upon him) has also said: "When the first night of Ramadan comes, the devils and the rebellious jinn are chained, the gates of Hell are locked and not one of them is opened; the gates of Paradise are opened and not one of them is locked; and a crier calls, 'You who desire what is good, come forward, and you who desire evil, refrain.' Some are freed from Hell by Allah, and that happens every night." (Narrated AbuHurayrah. Tirmidhi and Ibn Majah transmitted it. Ahmad transmitted it from a man. Tirmidhi said this is a gharib tradition)

Virtues of Suhur (pre-dawn meal), Saum (fast) and dos and don'ts while fasting

Saum i.e. the fast begins with Suhur – the pre-dawn meal and ends with Iftaar – the food taken at the dusk. Taking Suhur is Sunnah and though it is not mandatory, Prophet Mohammad (peace and blessings be upon him) had advised the Ummah to take the pre-dawn meal i.e. Suhur to begin the fast. Describing the virtues of Suhur the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “Take Suhur as there is a blessing in it.” (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Anas bin Malik)

The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) also termed it as the difference between the fast of the Muslims and of those from other faiths. As he said: “The difference between our fasting and that of the people of the Book is eating shortly before dawn.” (Sahih Muslim, Narrated by Amr ibn al-'As)

At another place the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him) said: “I used to take the "Suhur" meal with my family and hasten so as to catch the Fajr (Morning Prayer) with Allah's Apostle.” (Sahih Al Bukhari Narrated Sahl bin Sad)

There is no special Dua for Suhur. One can very well begin Suhur by reciting Bismillah and end it with any Dua that is normally recited after taking lunch, dinner or any other food. Likewise, you don’t need to verbally intend to begin your fast. Niyyat or intention has to be in heart and except Hajj and Umrah there is no other prayer for which verbal intention is required.

The best time for Suhur is just before Azan-e-Fajr. Those who take this pre-dawn meal very early or those who take it very late, both are wrong. In following tradition Zaid bin Thabit described the suitable time for Suhur: “We took the 'Suhur' (the meal taken before dawn while fasting is observed) with the Prophet and then stood up for the (morning) prayer. I asked him how long the interval between the two (Suhur and prayer) was. He replied, 'The interval between the two was just sufficient to recite fifty to Sixth 'Ayat.'” (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Anas)

Once finished with Suhur now we are fasting and while fasting we are under the continuous divine blessings. The Almighty Allah has promised unique reward for the fasting people. He Himself says: “Fasting is Mine and it is I who give reward for it. [A man] gives up his sexual passion, his food and his drink for my sake. Fasting is like a shield, and he who fasts has two joys: a joy when he breaks his fast and a joy when he meets his Lord. The change in the breath of the mouth of him who fasts is better in Allah's estimation than the smell of musk.” (Hadith Qudsi)

And the Prophet said: “Fasting is a shield (or a screen or a shelter). So, the person observing fasting should avoid sexual relation with his wife and should not behave foolishly and impudently, and if somebody fights with him or abuses him, he should tell him twice, 'I am fasting."

The Prophet added, "By Him in Whose Hands my soul is, the smell coming out from the mouth of a fasting person is better in the sight of Allah than the smell of musk. (Allah says about the fasting person), 'He has left his food, drink and desires for My sake. The fast is for Me. So I will reward (the fasting person) for it and the reward of good deeds is multiplied ten times.” (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Abu Huraira)

Dos and Don’ts while fasting

While fasting what one should do and what one shouldn’t? A fasting person should do every good work and should refrain from every evil. If a fasting person doesn’t refrain from evil and foul talk, his fast would be unacceptable. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said:
“Whoever does not give up false statements (i.e. telling lies), and evil deeds, and speaking bad words to others, Allah is not in need of his (fasting) leaving his food and drink.” (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Abu Huraira)

While fasting if anyone eats or takes any food by mistake then there is no harm on him. As soon as he realizes his mistake he should stop and continue with his fast. The Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him) said: “If somebody eats or drinks forgetfully then he should complete his fast, for what he has eaten or drunk, has been given to him by Allah.” (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Abu Huraira)
At another occasion the Prophet said:
“Neither vomiting, nor emission, nor cupping breaks the fast of the one who is fasting.” (Abu Dawood, Narrated by a man from the Companions)

Saum i.e. the fast ends with Iftaar at the time of sunset. As the sun sets, one should immediately complete the fast without waiting further. The Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him) was used to end his fats with dates. It is better if one follows the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him) and ends the fast using dates. But it is not mandatory. One can take water, milk or whatever food easily available to end the fast. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “When one of you is fasting, he should break his fast with dates; but if he cannot get any, then (he should break his fast) with water, for water is purifying.” (Abu Dawood Narrated by Salman ibn Amir)

Like Suhur, there is no special Dua for Iftaar also and one should end the fast reciting Bismillah. The time for Suhur and Iftaar both are very important. These are the times one Allah the Almighty listens to one’s prayers. Let us pray to Allah that He bestow on us the power to utilize these precious days to seek forgiveness from Him.

Tarawih

Tarawih, the Special Night Prayer, is normally offered in congregation during Ramadan. Tarawih, the Special Night Prayer is the first prayer that Muslims offer immediately after the new moon pronounces the beginning of the Holy month Ramadan. Tarawih is sunnah for both men and women, and they are to be performed after the obligatory Isha prayer and before the performance of the witr. They should be prayed in sets of two rakat each. It is allowed to pray them after witr, though, this is not the best thing to do. They may be performed until the end of the night.

The prayer that lasts for more than an hour is offered in congregation. Men, women and children throng the mosques in their vicinity to catch this important prayer. Prophet Mohammad (peace and blessings be upon him) during his lifetime had led this prayer in congregation on three consecutive nights. On fourth, a large number of companions were waiting for Prophet Mohammad (peace and blessings be upon him) to lead the night prayer as he had done in last three nights. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) however did not come out. The next morning he said that the prayer that they offered in congregation was enjoyed by the Almighty Allah so much so that he feared the prayer would be made obligatory. This was why he did not lead the prayer on fourth night. The incident is reported by Aisha, the respectable wife of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the mother of believers in Sahih Al Bukhari:
"One night Allah's Apostle offered the prayer in the Mosque and the people followed him. The next night he also offered the prayer and too many people gathered. On the third and the fourth nights more people gathered, but Allah's Apostle did not come out to them. In the morning he said, 'I saw what you were doing and nothing but the fear that it (i.e. the prayer) might be enjoined on you, stopped me from coming to you.' And that happened in the month of Ramadan." (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Aisha Siddiqua)
Before and after this incident the companions of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) were used to offer this prayer individually or in smaller groups. It continued even after his death and also during the tenure of Abu Bakra, the first caliph. Second Caliph Omar when he came in power however advised the people to offer Tarawih in congregation. Since then the Muslim Ummah is offering this prayer in congregation everywhere in the world. Imam Bukhari has reported this in his Sahih: Allah's Apostle said, "Whoever prayed at night the whole month of Ramadan out of sincere Faith and hoping for a reward from Allah, then all his previous sins will be forgiven."

Ibn Shihab (a sub-narrator) said, "Allah's Apostle died and the people continued observing that (i.e. Tarawih offered individually, not in congregation), and it remained as it was during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr and in the early days of 'Umar's Caliphate."
'Abdur Rahman bin 'Abdul Qari said, "I went out in the company of 'Umar bin Al Khattab one night in Ramadan to the mosque and found the people praying in different groups. A man praying alone or a man praying with a little group behind him. So, 'Umar said, “In my opinion I would better collect these (people) under the leadership of one qari (reciter) (i.e. let them pray in congregation!).”

So, he made up his mind to congregate them behind Ubai bin Ka'b. Then on another night I went again in his company and the people were praying behind their reciter. On that, 'Umar remarked, “What an excellent Bid'a (i.e. innovation in religion) this is! But the prayer which they do not perform, and sleep at its time is better than the one they are offering.” He meant the prayer in the last part of the night. (In those days) people used to pray in the early part of the night." (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Abu Huraira)

Tarawih, Qayamul Lail or Tahajjud

Tarawih is not any new prayer that is offered in Ramadan. In fact this is same as Tahajjud or Qayamul Lail or the Night Prayer that is normally offered every night during the entire year. The companions of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) were used to offer this prayer in congregation, and for hours. So much so that some of them were used to get exhausted. Hence what they would do. They would offer four Rakah and then take rest for a while before offering the remaining four Rakah. Due to this people started referring this Tahajjud or Qayamul Lail in Ramadan as Tarawih, the Arabic world that means taking rest.

Tarawih is Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and is not obligatory. It can be offered individually or in congregation. If a person has memorized enough parts of the Holy Quran, he can offer Tarawih alone if he wishes so. Those who cannot recite from Quran, can join for Tarawaih so that they can at least listen to the Holy Book.

It is believed that Holy Quran had been descended on Prophet Mohammad (peace and blessings be upon him) in Ramadan. It doesn't mean the entire Quran was descended on the prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) in Ramadan. The Quran in fact has been descended on the prophet (peace and blessings upon him) in parts. It was Ramadan when Mohammad (peace and blessings be upon him) was made prophet and the first five Ayah of Surah Alaq were recited to him. Recitation of the Holy Quran in Ramadan hence becomes more significant, and part or whole of the Holy Quran is recited by Huffaz – the people who memorise the Quran while offering Tarawih prayer.

Number of Rakat in Tarawih

Prophet Mohammad (peace and blessings be upon him) was used to offer the night prayers for hours and during Ramadan or in other months he used to offer eleven rakat as Tahajjud and Tarawih. Aisha the respected wife of the prophet and the mother of the believers confirmed this, as reported in Sahih Bukhari, in a very clear term:

I asked 'Aisha, "How is the prayer of Allah's Apostle during the month of Ramadan." She said, "Allah's Apostle never exceeded eleven Rakat in Ramadan or in other months; he used to offer four Rakat – do not ask me about their beauty and length, then four Rakat, do not ask me about their beauty and length, and then three Rakat." Aisha further said, "I said, 'O Allah's Apostle! Do you sleep before offering the Witr prayer?' He replied, 'O 'Aisha! My eyes sleep but my heart remains awake!' (Sahih Al Bukhari, Narrated by Abu Salma bin Abdur Rahman)

So it is better for us if we offer Tarawih lengthy and eleven rakat.

Some people think if they finish the entire Quran in seven or ten or fifteen days, then they don't need to pray Tarawih. This is wrong. Tarawih is nothing to do with the complete recitation of Quran. It has to be offered during entire Ramadan.

Moreover, those who have already offered Tarawih prayer, they don't need to offer Qayamul Lail again as we have already noted that Tarawih and Qayamul Lail are same and in Ramadan as well as other months, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) never exceeded eleven rakat.

9/01/2009 02:58:00 PM | Filed under | Read More »

Can there be a Category called Dalit Muslims?

By Imtiaz Ahmad

On the face of it, the ex-pression Dalit Muslims would appear to be a contradiction in terms. It is commonly held that Islam is an egalitarian religion and there are no status differences among Muslims. As such, there is no question of the prevalence of untouchability among them and a category called Dalit Muslims cannot be said to exist. This is the standard line that is handed down whenever any reference to Dalit Muslims is made.
This would be a perfectly understandable position to take were it not for the fact that considerable evidence exists to suggest that a category called Dalit Muslims does exist in India. Ghaus Ansari argued on the basis of evidence from the decennial censuses that Muslims in India were divided into three broad categories that he called the ashraf (noble born), ajlaf (mean and lowly) and arzal (excluded). Each of these categories was further divided into a number of groups which, following the practice of the decennial censuses, he chose to designate as castes. Since Ansari was relying on the evidence supplied by the decennial censuses, he could not examine the process of mutual interaction among these castes. He generally suggested that the three broad categories he had identified constituted a hierarchy in which the castes were ranked in an order of social precedence. How this hierarchy was constituted and what was the basis on which the rank order was settled were questions that Ansari could not discuss on account of the limitations of the data he used.

More focused research on social stratification among Muslims in the early seventies and subsequently relied upon empirical methods, painstakingly collecting information on actual, day-to-day interactions among the Muslim communities. This research succeeded in providing a more grounded picture of the situation of the groups whom Ansari had called arzal. It demonstrated that in terms of day-to-day social interactions the arzal existed on the margins of society. Even so, the range of dimensions of interaction that this research explored was restricted to areas of commensality, endogamy and sociality. It showed that the arzal engaged in the lowly occupation of scavenging, confined their marriages within the group and were excluded in the villages as well as the towns into separate residential quarters in which members of the other categories did not live. This research also noted the existence among the arzal communities of a system of internal government and social control with a hereditary official who regulated the life of group members and punished any transgressions of group norms besides settling domestic or intra-group disputes. Since much of this early research was focused on local communities, villages and towns, and covered groups falling into what Ansari had designated as arzal and ajlaf, the range of information on the arzal communities does not go beyond this limited range. For example, it is silent on the exclusion of the arzal communities in the ritual and religious spheres as well as on whether the religious specialists who cater to the ashraf and ajlaf communities also minister to them.

One question raised by this research was how the presence of groups whom Ansari had called arzal be explained. Should they be seen in strictly occupational terms as practitioners of a distinct occupation that in their case happened to be lowly and demeaning without status connotations? Or, should it be seen as arising from more fundamental and intrinsic considerations requiring evaluation of groups into a ranked social order? Opinions on this significant point were substantially determined by how one viewed the position of Islam in relation to social stratification. Those who took the position that Islam was against any social stratification and posited the inherent equality of all human beings tended to represent the presence of arzal communities as merely an occupational division without any status implications. From their point of view, the disabilities and exclusion characterizing the arzal communities applied to individuals and were relevant only in the occupational realm. Once their members move outside the occupational realm they are on par with everyone else. Others did not flatly take the position that Islam was against social stratification. They viewed the existence of arzal communities as reflecting a system in which groups were ranked as superior and inferior and individuals carried the burden of their group status through having to suffer disabilities and exclusion as members of groups.

Since the most elaborate ex-pression of a system of social stratification wherein groups are ranked as superior or inferior and individuals are forced to carry the burden of their group status is found in the caste system, one way of characterizing the presence of arzal communities could be in terms of caste. However, since Islam in popular imagination is seen as the harbinger of social equality, such characterization is open to contestation on ideological grounds. This has precisely been happening in sociological research on the arzal communities. At the behavioural level, sociologists are willing to concede that there are elements of caste in Indo-Muslim society. However, as soon as the discussion shifts from behaviour to ideology they recoil form their position, seeking to add caveats or hedge around the issue by admitting unabashedly that when they apply the term in the context of a Muslim group they are using it in a loose sense. Two recent writings by Husnain and Nazir exemplify this tendency most eloquently.

Husnain locates his discussion in the context of the question whether the concept of caste can be applied to the system of social stratification of a community professing a faith other than Hinduism. His conclusion is bald and simple: It is true that the egalitarian social order of Islam stands in sharp contrast with the ideology of caste yet the Indian Islam and Hindu Caste System have been able to achieve a substantial compatibility. He then goes on to offer a host of explanations for why this should be the case. He writes:

"Hutton sounds convincing when he says that when Muslims and Christians came to India, the caste was in the air and the followers of even these egalitarian ideologies could not escape the infection of caste. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Indian Muslim population comes form the lower Hindu castes who have been coming into the fold of Islam to escape from social persecution and the oppressive socio-economic disabilities. They were also attracted and lured by the social egalitarianism of Islam but the search for equality proved a mirage. In many cases there were improvements in their socio-economic condition yet the goal of social equality remained illusive. Moreover, in most of the cases the people embracing Islam gave up their religious faith but not the caste that was brought forward even to a new socio-religious milieu. Thus, it would be apt to say that while Islam may not be having castes or caste-like groupings, the Indian Muslims do have."

No sooner that he has made this sociological formulation, Husnain becomes uncomfortable. As if fearing that he might have committed an almost sacrilegious act by declaring that there is caste among Indian Muslims, he wishes to recoil from it. Cryptically, he adds: "But in the present paper an attempt is being made to stay clear of the issue whether the model of social stratification among the Indian Muslims is the replica of the Hindu caste system or not. The author, in this paper, shall be using the term caste and caste system among the Indian Muslims in a conveniently loose manner. It is undisputed that there are groups of people among the Muslims who are organised more or less like the Hindu castes but this is also true that many of them are less rigid because Islam, theoretically at least, permits marriage between different classes of believers."

Not only that. He looks for crutches that would enable him to perform this summersault. He finds one in the following statement of Nazir, which he quotes approvingly: ". . . . It is necessary to make a distinction between a caste system and caste labels: the former refers to a local system of hierarchically ordered corporate groupings involving division of labour, occupational specialisation, unequal dependence, and recruitment by birth only; the latter refers to a set of non-local, non-corporate named groups which provide a ranking hierarchy, and which do not involve occupational specialisation, unequal dependence, and recruitment by birth only."

Perhaps, concludes Husnain, the caste system and caste like groupings among the Indian Muslims with all its fluidity may be better analysed and better understood through this observation.

This assumes that Hindus live under the caste system. Muslims only use castes labels. Several theoretical and empirical questions are raised by this assumption. First, how is this assumption made? Is it made on the basis of a piece of empirical research? Or, is it made on entirely a priori grounds. As far as I am aware, there has to date been no empirical research which can be said to have established beyond the shadow of a doubt that Muslims do not live under a caste system and only use caste labels. Indeed, if such empirical research existed, the dilemma these authors (and others) face over how to characterise Muslim social stratification in India would not exist. It exists because available empirical research has demonstrated that social stratification of Muslim communities in India and beyond is marked by features of the caste system. It is, therefore, clear that the assumption is made on a priori grounds. As believing Muslims committed to upholding the widely proclaimed Islamic egalitarianism as axiomatic, they cannot face up to the behavioural reality that Muslims live under a caste system. They not only assume the distinction between the caste system and caste labels but go on to suggest that it constitutes a viable framework for analysing and understanding Muslim social stratification in India. It is used as a smokescreen to avoid facing the harsh behavioural reality of caste among Muslims in India.

Second, is there an empirical basis to the assertion that Muslim social organisation in India is a set of non-local, nor-corporate named groups which provide a ranking hierarchy, and which do not involve occupational specialisation, unequal dependence, and recruitment by birth only? Nazir does not make explicit the level at which he is talking. Is he talking about the categorisation of Muslims into the broad categories of ashraf, ajlaf and arzal. If that is his point of reference, then his characterisation of Muslim social organisation as a set of non-local, non-corporate groups can be said to have some validity. However, it would invalidate the distinction between the caste system and caste labels since similar broad division exists in the form of varna categories in the caste system. Ansari used the three broad categories of ashraf, ajlaf and arzal in the collective sense but clearly recognised that they were divided into smaller named groups that were distinguished from one another by occupation, endogamy and sociability. Thus, if Nazirs reference is to the groups at this level, then his description of Muslim groups is wholly erroneous. Let us look closely at the empirical evidence in order to determine whether the distinction he posits between the caste system and caste labels, and by implication between Hindu and Muslim modes of social organisation, is confirmed by available studies.
Sociological research on Muslims in India as opposed to lay and impressionistic writings continues to be thin. Evidence brought together by Ahmad (1973) and subsequent research demonstrates that Muslim groups which are the point of reference here, for which words biradari and zat are commonly used, are local and corporate entities. Even biradaris or zata such as Saiyyid, Sheikh and Ansaris, which are dispersed widely and found in different parts of a district, state or the county, are identified by their affiliation to a particular territory and restrict their marriages to members within that territory. Of course, how that territory is distinguished varies widely. For Sayyids, Shiekhs and Pathans, which resent being characterised as biradaris and prefer to be described as zats, the association to territory is expressed through appending the name of the territory to its name. Thus, one hears of Sayyids of Satrikh, Sheikhs of Allahabad, Kidwais of Baragaon or Kasauli and Pathans of Malihabad. In the case of biradaris that have an internal organisation of government and social control (called biradari or zat panchayat) this territorial association is defined by the jurisdiction of the biradari panchayat. The Ansaris in Rasulpur, where I carried out fieldwork, were divided into concentric circles of three and thirteen villages. They confined their marriages to thirteen villages though Ansaris existed in neighbouring areas as well.

This is not all. Considerable evidence exists to show that the biradaris or zats are associated with particular occupations, are inter-dependent (tied into patron-client relationships of the jajmani type), and are endogamous. This does not mean that all members of a biradari or zat necessarily practice the occupation with which their group is traditionally associated. There has been much variation throughout history among biradaris and zats, as indeed there has been within castes, in the extent to which their members remain tied to the practice of their traditional occupation. Biradaris and zats higher up in the social hierarchy did not usually have a traditional occupation and there was no close association between biradari or zat and traditional occupation. On the other hand, biradaris and zats further down the social ladder had traditional occupations and their association with occupation was strong. This was not significantly different from the picture of groups in what Nazir would characterise as the caste system. Risleys following observation makes this explicit:

In theory each caste has a distinctive occupation, but it does not follow that this traditional occupation is practised by its members . . . . The traditional occupation of the Brahmans is the priesthood, but in practice they follow all manner of pursuits. Many are clerks or cooks, while some are soldiers, lawyers, shop-keeprs and even day-labourers, but they remain Brahmans all the same. The Chamars of Bihar are workers in skin, but in Orissa they are toddy-drawers. In Orissa and the south of Gaya the Dhobi is often a hewer of splitter of wood. In Bihar and Bengal the Dom is a scavenger or basket maker, but in the Orissa states he is a drummer or basket maker and has nothing to do with the removal of nightsoil: in Chittagong and Assam he is a fisherman, in Cashmere a cultivator and in Kumaon a stone mason.

The argument that Muslim groups, biradaris and zats, are not based on recruitment by birth only is equally fallacious. Like the groups in what Nazir would call the caste system, Muslim biradaris and zats are based on recruitment by birth only. There is no process by which one can become a Saiyid, Shiekh or Julaha except that of birth. It is for this reason that when someone marries into another biradari or zat, he is not integrated into another biradari or zat but retains his or her original biradari or zat association. There exists a possibility in the case of biradaris and zats to attempt social mobility and end up becoming a Sayid, Shiekh or Pathan in course of time through inventing a rationale and a genealogy. Where such social mobility occurs, the basis of recruitment to the biradari or zat does not change. The biradari or zat just ends up becoming another biradari or zat, and comes to be known by another name, to which recruitment continues to be based on the principle of birth. This is again not significantly different from the situation in the caste system where castes have the possibility of changing their antecedents and name through the process of social mobility. Thus, the point that both biradaris and zats are less rigid, because Islam, theoretically at least, permits marriage between different classes of believers is not empirically established. It is commonly asserted without a substantial basis in any empirical research.

This raises fundamental questions. Why Husnain and Nazir as well as a host of other researchers who have worked on the sensitive question of the existence of caste among Muslims are so strongly persuaded to posit that there are significant differences between the caste system and the system of biradaris and zats? Is it that these differences actually exist but empirical research has so far failed to unearth them? Or, is it that they are persuaded into asserting these differences contrary to empirical evidence out of extraneous considerations? Is it that they are prone to emphasising these differences because as believing Muslims they are familiar with the Islamic discourse that asserts that Islam preaches social equality and are afraid to take a contrary position? Or, is it that asserting these differences is a defence mechanism whereby they can simultaneously adhere to their disciplinary obligation as social scientists as well as their religious obligation to uphold what is commonly considered the Islamic view on social stratification? My own view has been that the tendency to emphasise differences between the caste system and the system of biradaris and zats arises from some such considerations, but I would refrain from making any such point here. I would like, instead to explore whether their starting point that Islam is an egalitarian religion and preaches social equality theologically and sociologically valid. This is central to understanding their standpoint.

There is need to ask three different questions of the Islamic text if we are to understand Islams position with respect to social stratification and social equality. First, whether Islam is opposed to social stratification as such or is merely opposed to social inequality. Second, what is truly the Islamic attitude towards social inequality that existed in the society in which Islam evolved and took root. Finally, whether the social equality that it proclaims, and to which reference is always made when it is suggested that Islam is an egalitarian religion, is a description of an existing state of affairs in society or is merely an ideal that is given to mankind as a direction in which it should strive. It is necessary to ask these questions in order to understand the nature of the emphasis on egalitarianism and social equality in Islam. Basic to these questions is the sociological dictum that no society beyond the most primitive in the sense of lacking any kind of economic surplus can be truly egalitarian. This was the point at the heart of Veblens Theory of the Leisured Class wherein he argued that as societies generated economic surplus there almost always developed some form of social stratification. Of course, Veblens concern was an analysis of the lifestyle and consumption pattern of the class that controlled the economic surplus and the symbolic and behavioural ex-pressions of its privileged position. Even so, the substantive theoretical point of his analysis was that once a society starts generating economic surplus some form of social stratification is bound to emerge. Pitirim A. Sorokin articulated this point as a general statement:

“Any organised social group is always a stratified social body. There has not been and does not exist any permanent social group which is flat, and in which all members are equal. Unstratified society, with a real equality of its members, is a myth which has never been realised in the history of mankind. This statement may sound paradoxical and yet it is accurate. The forms and proportions of stratification vary, but its essence is permanent, as far as any permanent and organised social group is concerned.”

On even the most casual reading of the Islamic scriptural text one is struck that quite irrespective of the emphasis it places on equality of human beings Islams orientation is remarkably hierarchical. Its hierarchical orientation comes in a wide variety of fields. First, the relationship of the believers with non-believers is conceived in strictly hierarchical terms with the believer, the dhimmi and the kafir constituting a clear hierarchy. Second, the relationship of Allah to the believer is conceived in hierarchical terms. It is a relationship of subordination and subservience so much so that the individual believer must prostrate before Allah in daily prayers and must at the same time see himself as utterly powerless in relation to Him. Any number of passages exist in the Islamic scriptural text that endorse the relatively lowly standing of the believers, whether as individuals or as a collective entity, in relation to Allah. Second, the relationship of the wife to her husband is clearly conceived in hierarchical terms even if the text does not distinguish between them in terms of the religious duties enjoined upon them. This is sometimes cited by Muslim feminists and Muslim modernists to argue that Islam guarantees equality of gender and does not place a Muslim woman in any inferior position to a man. However, in reality a woman is subordinate to a man and the relationship between them is seen as constituting a hierarchy wherein the woman stands in relation to a man in the same position as the individual stands in relation to the community and the community stands in relation to Allah. Fatima Mernissi characterises this orientation of Islam in relation to women by the concept of nusuz, which implies an unequal relationship. Islam makes a distinction between the wives of the Prophet and other women and the responsibilities placed on them are also distinctly varied. Indeed, the Quranic verse that orthodoxy used at a later stage in the development of Islam to impose the custom of veiling for Muslim women originally related to the wives of the Prophet. Finally, the relationship between the master and slave is conceived in clearly hierarchical terms even if the master is called upon to deal with the slave with kindness and merit is assigned to those who would free their slaves. Thus, it is clear that the framework of Islamic thinking is deeply imbued with the notion of hierarchy and social stratification.

It is true that the Arab society in which Islam evolved did not possess great differences of wealth, but economic differentiation between ordinary Bedouins and the trading classes did exist. One can easily imagine that they would have differed with respect to their wealth, material possessions and lifestyles and Islam could not have brushed them under the carpet. It would have been required to deal with them, as they would have been reflected in their behaviour and mutual attitudes. As far as the Islamic scriptural text is concerned, it clearly recognises such distinctions in society and prescribes appropriate forms of behaviour for each. It asks those deprived in social and economic terms to be content and to live according to their means. It is repeatedly said in the text that Allah is All-seeing and would reward the poor for their poverty on the day of judgement. At the same time, the wealthy and rich, while they are allowed to live in their riches and to spend according to their economic standing, are warned not to be too proud of their material possessions. Moreover, they are asked to show kindness to those who are deprived and poor and to part with a portion of their wealth and income for the poor. Even the poor are conceived in hierarchical terms: first come the near ones followed by orphans and then the destitute and the deprived. If some kind of social stratification had not existed in society, Islamic scriptural text would neither have referred to those differences, nor indicated appropriate forms of behaviour for them. It would also not have sought to device an economic framework for the redistribution of wealth in a manner that the poor and able to meet both ends meet. It is, thus, clear that the emphasis that Islamic scriptural text places on social equality does not describe an existing state of affairs.

If the worldview of the Islamic scriptural text is hierarchical and it admits of social and economic differences in society, then how should we interpret its emphasis upon social equality? One way to interpret this can be to ignore that Islamic orientation is hierarchical and to argue that it stands for egalitarianism as an absolute value. I would argue that those who maintain that Islam contemplates no social stratification are interpreting Islam in precisely this way. Even when they encounter social differentiation and stratification, they glibly ignore it and flash the proclaimed egalitarianism of Islam as a social reality. The other way of interpretation can be to recognise a fundamental difference. This is the difference between the society as it exists and as it ought to exist and to maintain that the Islamic proclamation in favour of social equality is more in the nature of an ideal for the future than a description of an existing state of affairs. My own position is that drawing this distinction is important in any consideration of the question of the presence or absence of caste and caste-based social stratification in Indo-Muslim society. It enables us to see that a distinction has to be made between the society which exists, and where caste- or class-based distinctions may exist, and a future state of society where they are expected to disappear and give rise to an egalitarian society. This distinction applies to Islam as much as to any other ideological system that proclaims social equality as an ideal.

This distinction should not be entirely unfamiliar to us in India. As is well known, Indian society has been the most unequal society, the social inequality being institutionalised in the caste system. Indias constitution went on to declare India to be a casteless and classless society. In so doing, the constitution was not proclaiming that social inequalities of the past had entirely disappeared and the society was egalitarian from the time it was promulgated. The only sensible way would be to recognise that, while social inequalities persist, the ideal that the Constitution provides is that of egalitarianism. This is also true of Islam. It proclaims social equality to be an ideal, but recognises social inequalities existing in society. By this token, there is no contradiction between Islamic support for an egalitarian society as a future goal and presence of caste or class differences as a social reality.

Social realities have a way of prevailing over sociological and theological formulations. Contrary to the argument of some sociologists and most theologians that caste does not exist among Muslims and untouchability is disallowed in Islam, the ex-pression Dalit Muslims has been finding increasing mention in the discourse of traditionally backward Muslim communities in recent years. However, there does not yet exist any clear understanding of what this ex-pression actually means or which castes or groups it is supposed to denote. On the one hand, it has been used to denote a whole range of Muslim castes which are currently included in the category of the Other Backward Classes. On the other hand, it has been used to denote those Muslim castes or groups which converted from the untouchable Hindu castes or are so severely stigmatised and are subjected to such extreme forms of social exclusion that would render them comparable to the Scheduled Castes.

The Mandal Commission compounded and reinforced this confusion. As is already well-known, the Commissions task was to identify Other Backward Castes and to determine whether they should be eligible for reservation along the lines of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. There was no difficulty in this with respect to Hindu castes because administrative policy clearly recognised a distinction between Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes. Because the presidential order of 1950 clearly and arbitrarily laid down that No person wo professes a religion different from the Hindu religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste, the Mandal Commission lumped the severely stigmatised and extremely excluded among the Muslims with Muslim Other Backward Castes for purposes of affirmative action. Therefore, when the urge for equality and social justice seized the imagination of the lowest social groups in other religious traditions and the word Dalit came to be seen as a short-cut carrier of that aspiration, the ex-pression Dalit Muslims came to be used for a wide variety of groups other than those severely stigmatised and excluded and on that ground comparable to Hindu ex-untouchable castes for whom the term Scheduled Castes was reserved.

One can arrive at an assessment of the extent of confusion that prevails at present with respect to the ex-pression Dalit Muslims by reading between the lines in the statements of those claiming to speak on their behalf as well as by considering the castes that they have been tempted to include under that category. N. Jamal Ansari writes: . . . it is an established fact that Indian Muslim community is divided into castes and has a large deprived section. . . . Before discussing constitutional provisions in respect of Dalits and exclusion of all Dalit Muslims from those provisions, I think we must define Dalit Muslims. Dalit means downtrodden, oppressed, suppressed and backward. Also, Dalit stands for untouchable and depressed classes. The term Dalit applies to members of those menial castes that have been graded lowly which they have inherited by accident of birth. Likewise, Ali Anwar [18] uses the words pasmanda (meaning downtrodden and backward) and Dalit interchangeably and includes under Dalit Muslims castes like Bhatiyara, Tikyafarosh, Itafarosh, Halalkhor, Khakrob, Mogalzada and Chirimar only some of which can be said to be severely stigmatized and excluded. In all such statements and lists, as their reading suggests, the ex-pression Dalit Muslims has been used as a generic term to denote all Muslim castes that are educationally and socially backward.

Clearly, there is need to define Dalit Muslims in more precise terms. Ansari suggested in his early work that the relationships between the ashraf and ajlaf on the one hand and the arzal on the other were shaped by considerations of social distance taking on the characteristics of untouchability. He mentioned that the members of the category called arzal were excluded both physically and socially. From a physical point of view, they tended to inhabit excluded localities and did not mix with the members of the other two categories. When it came to social intercourse, their relationship was characterized by strict maintenance of social distance and deference so that the members of the arzal communities had minimal and limited interaction with the members of the other communities. The ex-pression should be restricted to refer to these castes alone. Since the ex-pression Dalit has come to acquire pejorative connotations, though it was originally used by the Dalit Panthers Movement as a short-hand way of referring to the extremely deprived and excluded castes, many Muslims may not like that ex-pression to be used in the context of Muslim castes. Even so, there is need to recognise that the castes to whom we have here referred to as Dalit Muslims do form a class separate from the other categories of Muslim castes and need to be distinguished on account of the extreme degree of stigmatisation and exclusion suffered by them.

There is need for rich and focussed ethnographic research on such castes. This research should seek to understand the attitudes of the non-arzal castes and groups toward the members of the arzal category and to gauge the extent and intensity of discrimination suffered by them today. It is possible that with the introduction of sanitary toilets and other technological changes the arzal castes no longer engage in the demeaning and defiling occupation of scavenging but social distance from them continues to be maintained. It is also possible that the forms of discrimination and stigmatisation practised against the arzal castes have changed, but they may have taken other forms. Only focussed social research can indicate the contemporary situation of the arzal castes in contemporary Muslim society.

(Courtesy: DalitMuslims.com)

8/31/2009 04:19:00 PM | Filed under | Read More »